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MGE UPS Systems, Inc. v. GE Consumer & Industrial, Inc.

As the world has transitioned into an increasingly digital marketplace, it has
become necessary for copyright owners to offer their works in digital format.1 However,
copyright holders were hesitant to release their works in digital form because of the
ease with which someone could infringe upon their rights by creating, distributing, and
downloading unlicensed copies of works. These activities can be prevented or deterred
by technological protections. Therefore, copyright owners only began to release their
work in digital form once they felt that there were sufficient technological protections,
such as encryption software on DVDs, in place for their works.2
Once technological protections were implemented to prevent infringement of
copyrighted works, infringers began to circumvent such measures. In response,
Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act3 (DMCA or the “Act”) in
1998 in order to prevent the circumvention of technological protections placed on
copyrighted works4 and promote the digitization of copyrighted works by providing
owners with more enforceable rights, specifically against individuals who circumvent
the technological protections in place, to frustrate infringement activities.5 The
DMCA has accomplished this end, as evidenced by the rich marketplace of digital
content we enjoy today.6 However, this progress faces potential erosion as a result of
the misinterpretation of the DMCA by the courts. The DMCA anti-circumvention
provisions have been interpreted narrowly, which provides little protection against
the circumvention of the technological protections used to battle infringement
activity.
As a result of such decisions, copyright owners may once again become wary of
offering their works in the digital marketplace. Circumvention of the technological
protections used to protect copyrighted works destroys the copyright holder’s ability

1.

See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001).

2.

Id. at 436.

3.

WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, § 101, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (implementing the World Intellectual Property Organization
Copyright Treaty and Performance and Phonograms Treaty within U. S. copyright law).

4.

See id. § 1201.

5.

Universal, 273 F.3d at 435.

6.

See Jeffrey Neu, IP, the Law, and Innovation, Technology and the Law (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.
jeffreyneu.com/20110214289/ip-the-law-and-innovation.html (“[T]he DMCA . . . provided for the
proliferation of blogs, online communities, [and] services like Twitter and YouTube.”).
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to receive “fair compensation” for their creative works.7 This in turn undermines
the goals of the U.S. copyright system under the U.S. Constitution.8
In MGE UPS Systems Inc. v. GE Consumer & Industrial Inc., the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendants (GE/PMI) did not circumvent the plaintiff ’s (MGE)
software protections and, therefore, were not in violation of the DMCA.9 Specifically,
the court reasoned that because MGE offered no evidence that a GE/PMI employee
altered MGE’s software and that because use of the software subsequent to alteration
did not constitute circumvention, MGE failed to show that GE/PMI had
circumvented MGE’s technological protections under the DMCA.10
This case comment contends that the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the meaning
of “circumvention” under DMCA § 1201(a)(1)(A)11 and § 1201(a)(3)(A)–(B)12 and
reached a decision contrary to the explicit purpose of the DMCA by holding that
once a work’s technological protections have been bypassed or avoided for the first
time, any subsequent use of the work would not amount to circumvention of its
technological protections. The court’s decision reduces the viability of the enforcement
mechanisms provided for in the DMCA by reducing the applicability of the anticircumvention provisions to a narrow subset of activity which, in turn, deprives
copyright owners of the ability to obtain fair compensation.13
7.

See Ensuring Artists Fair Compensation: Updating the Performance Right and Platform Parity for the 21st
Century: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 13–15 (2007) [hereinafter Updating the Performance Right] (statement of
Marybeth Peters, The Register of Copyrights) (“In order for the industry to continue to enrich society,
performers and record labels must be able to make a living by creating the works that broadcasters,
webcasters and consumer electronic companies are so eager to exploit for profit.”), http://judiciary.
house.gov/hearings/July2007/Peters070731.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2011); Alfred C. Yen, What Federal
Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA’s Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 649, 695.

8.

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).

9.

622 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2010).

10.

See id. at 1126. However, MGE offered evidence that GE/PMI employees used the software after
alteration had taken place. Id.

11.

“No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).

12.

As used in these subsections—

(A) to “circumvent a technological measure” means to descramble a scrambled work, to
decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair
a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner; and (B) a
technological measure “effectively controls access to a work” if the measure, in the
ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or
a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A)–(B) (2006).
13.

See Brief of Amici Curiae Entm’t Software Ass’n, et al. in Support of Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing
en banc at 7–8, MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010) (No.
08-10521), 2010 WL 4851679, at *7–8 [hereinafter Entm’t Software Ass’n].
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Specifically, the court erred by relying on the Second Circuit’s approach to
determining what constitutes circumvention under the DMCA, that is, because §
1201(a)(1) is targeted at circumvention, it does not apply to the use of copyrighted
works after the technological measure has been circumvented.14 By following the
Second Circuit’s interpretation, the MGE UPS Systems court failed to analyze the
conduct of GE/PMI employees and the actual method of circumvention those
employees used to gain access to MGE’s software. Following the Eighth Circuit’s
analysis regarding whether MGE’s technology effectively controlled access to their
copyrighted software would have better promoted the purposes of the DMCA.
In MGE UPS Systems, MGE manufactures uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
machines that are used during power outages to maintain power to vital computer
systems and servers.15 Some of these devices require the use of MGE’s copyrighted
software for servicing.16 The software enables a technician to perform complete
maintenance that could not be done without the software.17 Certain tasks, such as
calibration and voltage adjustment, are only possible while running the software.18
Operating MGE’s software requires the presence of an external hardware security
key called a “dongle”19 that is inserted in the computer’s serial port. 20 Each dongle
has an individual expiration date and a maximum number of uses, and requires a
password.21 When MGE’s software is activated, it looks for a properly programmed
dongle before it can fully launch.22 When launched, the software runs through a
second series of protocol exchanges with data located on the UPS machine being
serviced in order to confirm that MGE software is communicating with MGE
hardware.23 If the protocol exchange is successful, MGE’s software collects system
status information for the technician.24
GE/PMI is in the business of servicing UPS machines, and hired MGE to
perform service on MGE UPS machines.25 At some time before June 2000, a group
of GE/PMI employees acquired a cracked copy of MGE’s software from an unknown
14.

See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he DMCA targets the
circumvention of digital walls guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in circumvention tools),
but does not concern itself with the use of those materials after circumvention has occurred.”).

15.

MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 364.

16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

A dongle is a device similar to the USB memory sticks widely used today.

20. MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 364.
21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.
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source.26 GE/PMI maintained and used at least one laptop with an unlicensed copy
of MGE software. 27 One of GE/PMI’s employees personally used the software
program on a number of occasions, and GE/PMI used the MGE software without
the required dongle, meaning that GE/PMI was engaging in unauthorized used of
the MGE software.28 GE/PMI later admitted to recovering a laptop from a former
employee that contained cracked MGE software and also admitted that the software
had been used five times from June 2000 through May 2002, presumably without
the presence of the dongle security key. 29
In December 2004, MGE filed suit against GE/PMI in federal district court for
various violations of MGE’s intellectual property rights in its software, including
copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and DMCA violations. 30
MGE claimed that GE/PMI used its software without authorization 428 times.31
During the subsequent trial, the district court dismissed the DMCA claim and
provided no reasoning for doing so.32
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, MGE argued that the district court erred in
dismissing the DMCA claim because GE/PMI had in fact cracked MGE’s software.33
MGE argued that because GE/PMI was unable to obtain licenses to legally use
MGE’s software, GE/PMI employees circulated emails discussing ways to bypass
the software’s technological protections and ultimately did so. 34
GE/PMI argued that no GE/PMI employee or representative had actually
“circumvented” the software’s security features pursuant to the DMCA. 35 GE/PMI
argued that a GE/PMI employee or representative had merely used the software

26. Id. Software hackers posted general instructions on the Internet about how to defeat the external security

features of a hardware key, though not referencing MGE specifically. See, e.g., Zeezee, Zen and the
Art of Dongle Cracking (Dec. 27, 1997), http://www.woodmann.com/fravia/zee__4.htm.

27.

Brief of Appellant at 11–13, MGE UPS Sys., Inc., v. Power Prot. Servs., LLC, 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir.
2009) (No. 08-10521), 2009 WL 7170924, at *11–13 (“Both witnesses testified that the Pacret program
was used without an external hardware security key. Both testified that the Pacret software had been
‘cracked.’”) (internal citations omitted).

28. Id.
29. Id.; MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 364.
30. MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 364.
31.

Id. (noting that some of these uses occurred “after the district court granted MGE a preliminary
injunction against GE/PMI’s use of MGE’s software”).

32.

Id. at 365. As for MGE’s other claims, the jury awarded MGE damages of $4,624,000 for
misappropriation of trade secrets. Id.

33.

Id.

34. Appellant’s Resp. to Cross-Appeal and Reply at 2, MGE UPS Sys., Inc., v. Power Prot. Servs., LLC,

622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-10521), 2009 WL 7170926 at *2.

35.

MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 365–66.
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after some other party had disabled the code, and that this did not constitute a
violation of the DMCA.36
The Fifth Circuit held that the GE/PMI’s actions did not amount to
circumvention. 37 The court identified the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision,
which states, “No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title.” 38 The DMCA defines
“circumvent[ing] a technological measure” as “descramb[ling] a scrambled work,
decryp[ting] an encrypted work, or otherwise avoid[ing], bypass[ing], remov[ing],
deactivat[ing], or impair[ing] a technological measure, without the authority of the
copyright owner.”39 “[E]ffectively controls access to a work” means that “the measure,
in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a
process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to
the work.”40
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal that granted MGE’s
DMCA claim against GE/PMI.41 The court reasoned that the issue was “not whether
the technological measures that effectively controlled access to MGE’s software were
circumvented at some point, but whether the actions of GE/PMI’s own representatives
amounted to circumvention.”42 Thus, the court ultimately found that the actions of
the GE/PMI did not amount to circumvention because it interpreted § 1201(a)(3)(A)
as not prohibiting use of a copyrighted work subsequent to the initial circumvention.43
The Fifth Circuit found that MGE failed to show that any GE/PMI employee had
modified MGE’s software so that the dongle would no longer be required for
operation.44 The court further explained that reading the DMCA to prohibit the use
of copyrighted works after circumvention has taken place would be too broad an
interpretation. Such an interpretation would result in an extension of the DMCA
“beyond its intended purposes to reach extensive conduct already well-regulated by
existing copyright law.”45
This case comment contends that the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the meaning
of circumvention under the DMCA and reached a decision contrary to the explicit
purposes of the DMCA by holding that once a work’s technological protections have
been bypassed or avoided for the first time, any subsequent uses of the work would
36. Id. at 365. (“As a result, GE/PMI argues, its actions did not violate the DMCA and would, at most,

have amounted to copyright infringement.”).

37.

Id. at 366.

38. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
39.

Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).

40. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
41.

MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 366.

42.

Id. (emphasis added).

43.

See id.

44. See id.
45.

Id.

810

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

not amount to circumvention of those technological protections. The following
analysis will discuss the applicable case law in other circuits where courts have applied
the DMCA anti-circumvention provision and explain how the Fifth Circuit should
have interpreted this provision in light of the prior cases by analyzing whether MGE’s
technological protections effectively controlled access to MGE’s copyrighted software.
The court’s decision is contrary to the purpose of promoting the digitization of
copyrighted works by providing owners with more enforceable rights because it
reduces the viability of the protections provided in the Act.46 The Fifth Circuit’s
holding effectively nullifies the protection that the DMCA provides copyright
owners against individuals who might circumvent technological protections and thus
deprives the rights holders of fair compensation.47 Fair compensation provides
incentive for and enables individuals to create and contribute to society in the ways
copyright law was designed to promote. If courts interpret statutory tools in ways
that do not uphold such incentives, individuals are unlikely to put forth their
beneficial contributions into society.
In the disposition of MGE’s anti-circumvention claim, the Fifth Circuit relied
solely on a Second Circuit case, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, which held that
injunctions under the DMCA were not unconstitutional.48 This reliance was improper
for two reasons: First, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly applied the dicta set forth in
Universal because it was not relevant to the provisions of the DMCA at issue in
MGE UPS Systems. Second, there was a substantial difference in the technology at
issue in the two cases.
In Universal, the plaintiff movie studios brought an action seeking injunctive
relief against the defendant, Eric Corley, under the anti-trafficking provisions of the
DMCA.49 The plaintiffs claimed Corley violated the DMCA’s anti-circumvention
provision as well as the provisions against trafficking in circumvented material by
posting an article on his website about hacking DVD encryption software.50 The
technology at issue was the Content Scramble System (CSS) implemented by movie
studios to reduce piracy threatening their DVD releases.51 CSS is encryption software
that uses an algorithm configured by a set of keys to encrypt a DVD’s contents, and
therefore protect it against infringers.52 The algorithm is a mathematical formula for
46. See Entm’t Software Ass’n., supra note 13, at 7–8.
47.

See id. at 7–8.

48. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
49. Id. at 436.
50. Id. at 435–36.
51.

Id. at 436–37.

52.

Id.

CSS is the protection system that has enabled the owners of movie content to provide
consumers access to high quality DVD movies for home viewing on their video systems
and computers. CSS is made available to allow product manufacturers to offer exciting
products for consumers to use to enjoy DVD motion pictures while also protecting
those motion pictures from unauthorized duplication, protecting from infringement the
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transforming a movie file into an unreadable and non-viewable format. The keys are
strings of zeros and ones that serve as values for the mathematical formula.53 In order
to decrypt the CSS-protected files, a compliant DVD player must contain a set of
player keys and understand the CSS encryption algorithm.54 The DVD player cannot
access the contents of a CSS-protected DVD without the player keys and the
algorithm.55 With the player keys and the algorithm, a DVD player can display the
movie, but does not give a viewer the ability to copy the movie or to manipulate the
digital content of the DVD.56
A teenage hacker named Jon Johansen developed a program called DeCSS that
decrypted CSS-protected files.57 Corley posted an article on his website about
Johansen’s DeCSS program, which explained that DeCSS could be used to copy
DVDs. He also provided copies of the object and source code for DeCSS, enabling
others to use it.58 The movie studios, through the Internet investigations division of
the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), became aware of the availability
of DeCSS on the Internet and responded by sending out a number of cease and
desist letters to website operators who posted the software, some of whom removed it
from their sites.59 In January 2000, the studios filed this lawsuit against defendant
Eric Corley and two others.
The Second Circuit did not discuss § 1201(a)(1) with any depth, did not provide
an analytical framework for determining whether circumvention has occurred under
§ 1201(a)(1), and did not go further than defining circumvention under § 1201(c)(1)
differentiating it from the trafficking provisions of the DMCA.60
First, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the § 1201(a)(1) anti-circumvention provision
relied on a portion of the Universal opinion discussing § 1201(c)(1), which prohibits
trafficking in circumventing technologies, such as distributing a program designed to
circumvent a technological protection, not whether certain technologies constituted
circumvention. There was no mention of §1201(a)(1) and no analysis of the anticircumvention provision in the portion of Universal that the MGE Systems court cites
to. 61 The Second Circuit instead focused its analysis on the trafficking of
intellectual property contributed by the many writers, directors, actors, and producers
who create such works.

About DVDCCA, DVD Copy Control Ass’n, http://www.dvdcca.org/about.aspx (last visited Oct. 15,
2011).
53.

Universal, 273 F.3d at 436.

54. Id. at 437.
55.

Id.

56. Id.
57.

Id.

58. Id. at 439.
59.

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

60. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440–41 (2d Cir. 2001).
61.

See id. at 444.
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circumventing technology and ultimately decided the case on constitutional grounds
because the appellant was attempting to argue that the DMCA was unconstitutionally
broad in contravention of the First Amendment.62
Whether or not circumvention occurred was not the issue in Universal; instead
the Second Circuit was analyzing a district court injunction that applied the DMCA
to the defendants by imposing two types of prohibitions both grounded in the antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA.63 The first type prohibited posting DeCSS or
any other technology for circumventing CSS on any website and the second type
prohibited knowingly linking any Internet website to any other website containing
DeCSS.64 The Second Circuit did not interpret or apply the anti-circumvention
provision.65 The anti-circumvention provision prohibits the actual use of circumvention
technology to obtain access to a copyrighted work without the copyright owner’s
authority,66 whereas the anti-trafficking provisions focus on the trafficking in
circumvention technology, regardless of whether it leads a third party to circumvent
an access or copy control.67 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Universal was
misplaced because the Second Circuit did not apply the DMCA anti-circumvention
provisions that were relevant in MGE UPS Systems.
Second, the difference in the technologies at issue in Universal and MGE UPS
Systems is also significant. The CSS protection technology is distinct from the
copyrighted movie contained on the DVD,68 whereas the technological protection
encoded in MGE’s software is not distinct from the software itself; rather it is an
integral part of the operation of the software. The CSS needs to be circumvented
only once in order for someone to access the movie because subsequent copying and
playing do not require bypassing the CSS program each time.69 In contrast, the
dongle used by MGE supplied the authentication information that was required to
run MGE’s software each time the software was used. Therefore, the cracked version of
MGE’s software circumvented the same authentication process each time it was
used.70 The court failed to recognize that each time GE/PMI employees used MGE’s
software they were circumventing the technology, unlike in Universal where the
circumvention only needed to take place once for each DVD that was played or
62. See id. at 457–59.
63. See id. at 453–60.
64. Id. at 443.
65.

See id.

66. Circumvention vs. Trafficking in Circumvention Tools, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property

Sec. U.S. Dep’t of Justice 187, http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual/05ipma.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2011).

67.

Id.

68. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436–38 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing CSS

technology).

69. Id.
70. MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2010).
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copied. The difference between the two technologies weakens the court’s reasoning
and conclusion that, “[T]he actions by GE/PMI employees did not amount to
circumvention. . . . Without proving GE/PMI actually circumvented the technology,
MGE does not present a valid DMCA claim.” 71
In Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, the Eighth Circuit analyzed the issue of
circumvention under DMCA §1201(a)(1)(A).72 The case was brought by the plaintiff
copyright owners in computer software and online gaming systems against the
defendant company that also offered online gaming services—services that exploited
the plaintiff ’s protected properties.73 In this case, the plaintiff sold gaming software
and offered an additional online gaming service to purchasers of its games.74
Installation of the game on the purchaser’s personal computer required entry of a CD
key as well as agreement to various licenses.75
The defendant’s service was an emulator developed as an alternative to the
plaintiff ’s online gaming system. The emulator allowed access to an online gaming
service, identical to the plaintiff ’s but hosted on a different server, without the
purchase of the plaintiff ’s games or entry of a valid CD key.76 The defendant’s
emulator provided a server that allowed gamers unable or unwilling to connect to the
plaintiff ’s online gaming system to nevertheless access and experience the multiplayer features of the plaintiff ’s games.77 The emulator attempted to mirror all of the
user-visible features of the plaintiff ’s system, including online discussion forums and
information about the emulator project, as well as access to the emulator’s computer
code for others to copy and modify.78 The court found that a user could perceive no
difference between the two services79 and held that the defendant’s site amounted to
circumvention because it did not require a valid CD key and, as a result, allowed a
user to freely play unauthorized copies of the plaintiff ’s game.80
The Fifth Circuit should have reached the same conclusion regarding GE/PMI’s
employees’ actions in using a modified version of MGE’s software that did not
require the dongle. MGE’s software is similar to that of the Davidson plaintiff, in
that each requires a “key” of sorts to be operated with each use.81 MGE’s software
required the dongle, whereas the Davidson plaintiff ’s software required a valid CD
71.

Id. at 366.

72. 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
73. Id. at 632.
74.

Id. at 633.

75. Id.
76. Id at 635.
77.

Id.

78. Id.
79. See id. at 636.
80. See id. at 642.
81.

Id. at 635; MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2010).
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key.82 Each time the software of either company was operated, the programming
code was designed to search for the “key.” Consequently, each time GE/PMI
employees operated the modified MGE software, the particular technology was
circumvented in violation of the DMCA.83
The Fifth Circuit concluded that MGE’s software had only been circumvented
by the person who developed the cracked version and that GE/PMI’s subsequent use
of that version was not circumvention of a technical measure. The Fifth Circuit
supported this latter conclusion by pointing to the fact that MGE failed to present
evidence that a GE/PMI representative altered the software.84 The Fifth Circuit’s
conclusion on this point ignores the fact that GE/PMI circumvented MGE’s
technological protection each time they operated the software without authorization.
The technology was similar in MGE and Davidson and, therefore, the Fifth Circuit
should have relied on the analytical framework applied in Davidson by analyzing
whether MGE’s dongle “effectively controlled access” to their software and whether
GE/PMI employees bypassed the dongle each time they ran the software, rather
than focusing on who circumvented the software.85 As described previously, MGE’s
dongle effectively controlled access to its software because it provided security
information, acting as a key that was required to gain access to and run MGE’s
software. GE/PMI employees bypassed the dongle, without authorization, each time
they operated the software and were, therefore, circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controlled access to MGE’s software. By following the
Davidson analysis, the Fifth Circuit would have interpreted circumvention under the
DMCA to mean that each unauthorized use of software protected by means that
effectively controlled access to the software, amounted to an act of circumvention of
such protections. And in doing so, the court would have upheld the purposes of the
DMCA.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision frustrates Congress’s purpose in enacting the
DMCA. The DMCA was enacted because “Congress was concerned that, absent a
strong federal prohibition on circumventing such technological locks, copyright
owners would be unwilling to release digital versions of their works in online
marketplaces.”86 DMCA § 1201(a) provides copyright owners with protection against
individuals who might circumvent technological protections, thus depriving the
owners of fair compensation.87 The court even recognized this purpose of the DMCA
82. Davidson, 422 F.3d at 635.
83. Id. at 642.
84. See MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 365.
85. See Davidson, 422 F.3d at 640.
86. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Rehearing at 9, MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE

Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-10521) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-551,
Part II, at 23 (1998)).

87.

See Brief of Amicus Curiae Motion Picture Ass’n Of America, Inc. in Support of Appellant’s Petition
for Rehearing en banc at 7–8, MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361 (5th
Cir. 2010) (No. 08-10521).
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in its opinion, stating, “One of Congress’ purposes behind enacting the DMCA was
targeting the circumvention of technological protections.” 88 Marybeth Peters, the
acting Register of Copyrights, suggests that ensuring fair compensation serves as a
stimulus for creators to develop new works in the future.89 Strong incentives are
needed for creators to continue their artistic endeavors and to encourage the continued
development of technological advances, such as DRM,90 that enable the legitimate
exploitation of and ensure access to creative works.91 Without protections such as the
DMCA anti-circumvention provision, new technologies pose a risk of erosion of the
rich digital marketplace for works.92
Contrary to the purpose of the DMCA,93 the court’s decision renders it much
more difficult for copyright owners to enforce their rights against individuals who
circumvent technological protections because, under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation,
the anti-circumvention provision only applies to the first person to circumvent a
technological protection and therefore does not apply to individuals who subsequently
access the protected work, even if they do so by following the same methods and
circumventing the protection. The Fifth Circuit effectively requires plaintiffs to
show that an individual was the mastermind behind a circumvention measure. The
court is unwilling to apply the anti-circumvention provision to subsequent
circumvention activity once an initial circumvention has taken place. This reduces
the applicability of the standard to a small subset of individuals who initially
circumvent a technological protection. It does not apply to users who subsequently
access the work by circumventing the protection, which in turn greatly reduces
copyright holders’ enforcement rights and limits their ability to bring claims against
all infringers; they are effectively limited to only the smaller subset of individuals.94
Under the reasoning of MGE UPS Systems, if an individual with computer
programming skills writes a computer program that is capable of generating serial
numbers for software and makes that program freely available for download on the
Internet, the program writer would be in violation of the DMCA anti-circumvention
provision. However, any individuals who downloaded the program, use it to generate
88. MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 365.
89. See Updating the Performance Right, supra note 7.
90. “DRM” stands for “digital rights management,” which are access control technologies used by copyright

holders to limit the use of digital content. Digital Rights Management, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Digital_rights_management (last modified Oct. 10, 2011). An example of DRM is MGE’s
dongle. Another well known example is Apple Inc.’s FairPlay technology, which is used to protect works
available from the iTunes store.

91.

See Updating the Performance Right, supra note 89.

92.

See id.

93.

H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998) (“The Committee thus seeks to protect the interests of copyright
owners in the digital environment, while ensuring that copyright law remain technology neural.”).

94. Colin Folawn, Neighborhood Watch: The Negation of Rights Caused by the Notice Requirement in Copyright

Enforcement Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 26 Seattle U. L. Rev. 979, 979–80 (2003)
(“Because they are unable to effectively enforce copyrights, independent copyright holders experience a
negation of rights.”).
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a serial number, and use it to operate the software without purchasing the software
would not be in violation of the circumvention provision. The individual who
generates the serial number and uses it to operate the software is circumventing the
technological protections in place for that software just as much as the person who
wrote the code for the circumventing program, but only the person who created the
generation software would be liable.
Such a result is contrary to the purpose of the DMCA because the copyright
holder could only enforce their rights against the computer programmer and not
against the individuals who circumvent the serial number technology in order to use
software without paying for it.95 Copyright owners would most certainly be unwilling
to release their content into digital marketplaces if they can only enforce their rights
against such a small subset of individuals and cannot reach the individuals truly
violating their rights.96 This will result in devolution of the digital content space
because copyright owners will again feel threatened by infringement activity.
Additionally, the law created by the Fifth Circuit establishes a disincentive to create
and innovate, especially in the DRM space, because the DMCA cannot be used to
enforce rights against individuals who truly circumvent DRM technology.
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that use of a copyrighted work subsequent to
circumvention was an overbroad construction of §1201(a)(1)(A) that extended the
DMCA beyond its intended purposes to reach conduct already covered by existing
copyright law.97 This reasoning is not supported by a correct interpretation of the
statute. For example, David Nimmer characterizes circumventing a technological
protection in place to protect a copyrighted work as “the electronic equivalent of
breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book.” 98 Under this
characterization, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation applies the DMCA only to the
first person to break into the locked room by using a particular means. If a second
person comes along after the room has been broken into and uses the same means as
the first person to enter and take a book, they have not circumvented the protection
and should only be liable for taking the book. Under criminal law principles, both
individuals would be liable for trespass as well as theft, the second person would not
face less liability because the first person did the breaking in. The second person had
to circumvent the locked door; the first person that broke in simply made it easier for
the second person to do so.
U.S. copyright law can be described as “statutory unfair competition based on the
misappropriation rationale.”99 The law protects copyrighted “work against predatory
95. See S. Rep. No. 105-90, at 10–11 (1998).
96. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[M]ovie studios were

reluctant to release movies in digital form until they were confident they had in place adequate safeguards
against piracy of their copyrighted movies.”).

97.

MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2010).

98. 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §12A.03[D][1] (Matthew

Bender, rev. ed. 2011).

99. L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1987).
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competitive practices.” 100 Copyright law’s constitutional purpose of promoting
progress is served by encouraging the distribution of works. Congress encourages
this through the DMCA by ensuring that creators receive fair compensation, making
them willing to distribute their works to the public.101 The Senate Report on the
DMCA states that the Act enforces private parties’ use of technological protection
measures through legal sanctions for circumvention of such measures. Legal sanctions
will be applied when a person has not obtained authorized access to a protected work
for which the copyright owner has utilized a technological measure that effectively
controls access to the work.102
Without strong incentives for creators to continue to offer their works in digital
form and to encourage the continued development of technological advances that
enable the legitimate exploitation of and ensure access to creative works, the diverse
and expansive digital marketplace for works we enjoy today will degrade.103 The
Fifth Circuit’s holding in MGE UPS Systems effectively nullifies this protection and
obstructs this goal.
The Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the meaning of “circumvention” under § 1201(a)
(1)(A) by using the Second Circuit’s method of analysis, which was based on different
provisions of the DMCA. Following the construction of the provision and analysis
adopted by the Eighth Circuit in analogous cases would have been a better approach
that promoted the purposes of the DMCA. Furthermore, the court failed to
understand and distinguish the technological considerations at issue and did not
conduct an analysis of the conduct of GE/PMI’s employees and the actual
circumvention method used to gain access to MGE’s software with sufficient depth.
In reaching a decision contrary to one of the explicit purposes of the DMCA, the
court held that “bypass” and “avoid,” as used in the statute, “do not . . . encompass
use of a copyrighted work subsequent to circumvention merely because that use would
have been subject to a technological measure that would have controlled access to the
work, but for that circumvention.”104
The Fifth Circuit should have relied on the analytical framework provided by
Davidson by analyzing whether MGE’s dongle “effectively control[led] access” to
their software and whether GE/PMI employees bypassed or avoided the dongle.105
By following the Davidson analysis, the Fifth Circuit would have applied an
interpretation of circumvention, encompassing subsequent bypassing of a technological
protection that upholds the purposes of the DMCA and provides copyright owners
with fair compensation.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 11.
102. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 10–11.
103. See id. at 7.
104. See MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2010).
105. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 640 (8th Cir. 2005).
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